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The Pricing of Assurance Services in
Secondary Equity Offerings
NEIL L. FARGHER*
BRIAN W. MAYHEW**
MICHAEL WILKINS***
This paper examines the pricing of assurance services in secondary equity
offerings (SEOs). Our empirical model extends initial public offering
(IPO) fee specifications to include variables that are unique to, or more
relevant for, secondary offerings. We document an inverse relationship
between SEO fees and a client’s ability to delay its secondary offering,
suggesting that auditors do not charge as much for SEOs made by rela-
tively mature firms. The relationship reverses, however, when the client is
required to use more comprehensive types of filings (i.e., when assurance
effort is higher). We also show that fees are higher when the SEO comes
to market during the client’s annual audit period. This finding is consistent
with the shifting of year-end audit fees to SEO engagements in an effort
to boost earnings for both clients and auditors (at the expense of share-
holders). We cannot, however, unambiguously conclude that fee shifting
exists, as the observed fee premium could be explained by other factors.
1. Introduction
This paper examines the pricing of assurance services provided as part of a
client’s secondary equity offering (SEO). A number of previous studies have ex-
amined the role of auditors in initial public offerings (IPOs) (e.g., Menon & Wil-
liams [1991], Hogan [1997], Willenborg [1999], Fargher, Fields & Wilkins [2000],
Mayhew & Wilkins [2003]). However, there has been no research to date on the
assurance provided for secondary equity offerings. Because SEOs typically provide
infusions of equity capital that are much larger than those associated with IPOs,
the study of secondaries is an economically important issue (e.g., Spiess & Affleck-
Graves [1995]; Loughran & Ritter [1997]; Teoh, Welch & Wong [1998]; Rangan
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[1998]; Koop & Li [2001]). Furthermore, the SEO setting facilitates research ques-
tions that differ from those associated with initial public offerings.
Both the scope of services and the primary risk for the auditor are likely to
differ for SEO engagements relative to IPO engagements. For example, SEOs occur
primarily among firms that have matured and experienced some degree of financial
success since their initial equity offering. As a result, such firms should have lower
levels of inherent risk and business risk than IPO firms. Furthermore, assurance
work in a secondary offering is comprised mainly of analyses of subsequent events
rather than the extensive substantive testing associated with initial offerings. Be-
cause the types of firms involved and the types of assurance work involved differ
between SEOs and IPOs, fee determinants may differ as well. It is our purpose in
this paper to investigate this issue empirically. More generally, our analysis of SEO
fees allows insights into how accounting firms price a particular type of nonaudit
service. Investigations such as this are important, given the concerns of regulators
and the public about the provision of nonaudit services.
Our tests begin with a model used extensively in the IPO fee literature. We
augment this model with additional measures that we believe to be particularly
important in the context of providing SEO assurance. First, the results of Koop
and Li (2001) and Eberhart and Siddique (2002) suggest that a firm that success-
fully develops beyond its initial public offering will have a decline in its operating
and default risk. Based on this, we assume that IPO firms that do not have to return
quickly to the public equity markets—those which are able to generate additional
financing more cheaply from internal operations or external debt—have lower lev-
els of risk.1 As a result, we propose that assurance fees should be lower for firms
that are able to delay their secondary offerings. Our results support this prediction.
We also find, however, that a fee premium exists for firms that delay their SEOs
if the offerings are registered using Form S-1—a filing that requires greater assur-
ance effort.2
We also consider the timing of the offering relative to the annual financial
statement audit. We conjecture that fees will be higher, the closer the SEO is to
the annual audit date, for at least two potential reasons. First, certain factors may
exist—such as higher billable rates and greater involvement of high-level staff and
partners during the busiest time of the year—that would lead to a natural premium
for SEO engagements that overlap with the client’s annual financial statement audit.
Second, incentives exist for opportunistic behavior on the part of both managers
and auditors. Corporate managers have an incentive to shift fees from the audit
engagement to the SEO engagement because fees associated with the SEO—ap-
propriately classified as a direct cost of raising equity capital—do not reduce net
1. In an audit pricing framework, we assume that SEO fees are increasing primarily in inherent
risk and business risk.
2. Firms required to use Form S-1 must include all financial information in the prospectus. Those
eligible to use other filings may choose to include such information by reference. Details are provided
later in the paper.
THE PRICING OF ASSURANCE SERVICES 189
income. Similar incentives exist for auditors because an audit firm’s margins for
nonrecurring work typically exceed the margins for its standard audit work.3
Empirically, we find that fees are significantly higher for secondary issues that
come to market during the annual audit period, even after controlling for the po-
tential effects associated with audit firms’ “busy season.” We also find that fees
are significantly higher among SEO firms that have the greatest incentive to prevent
fees from flowing through the income statement. Because data limitations prevent
us from being able to provide a direct test of the fee-shifting explanation, we cannot
specifically attribute the premium we observe empirically to opportunistic behavior
on the part of clients or auditors. However, our findings certainly are consistent
with this notion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides
background on the nature of assurance for SEOs. We then briefly consider factors
specific to SEO assurance that potentially impact fees. Next, we describe our sam-
ple, develop our fee model, and present our results. The final section provides
concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
2. Background
In this section, we briefly outline the mechanics of secondary equity offerings
and the auditor’s role in the process. Our understanding of the SEO process was
developed through a review of the professional literature and via discussions with
both practicing and former public accountants with significant SEO experience.
To initiate an SEO, a company must file the necessary registration statement
with the SEC. The registration statement consists of two parts. Part 1—the pro-
spectus—contains all of the information about the offering, including the firm’s
financial statements. Part 2 contains supplemental data and SEC procedural infor-
mation (Aftermann [1995]). The main liability associated with SEOs stems from
the registration statement. Under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act, an investor
can sue the participants in the SEO by claiming that the registration statement is
flawed.
Three professional groups assist clients participating in SEOs—attorneys, un-
derwriters and accountants (Aftermann [1995]). The main role of attorneys is to
prepare the registration statement and to manage the issuer’s compliance with all
applicable securities laws. The underwriter’s role is to market the offering to in-
vestors. The underwriter bears two significant sources of risk: (1) market risk—in
most cases it purchases the issuer’s shares and resells them on the open market—
and (2) litigation risk—as an expert in the issuance process, it faces liability under
Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act. The accountant serves two roles in a sec-
ondary offering. First, the 1933 Act requires the filing of three years of audited
financial statements (or audited financials for the life of the entity if it is less than
3. Discussions with audit practitioners lead us to believe that both parties have an incentive to
shift fees from the annual audit to the secondary offering.
190 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & FINANCE
three years). The accountant must attest to the financial statements to meet this re-
quirement. Second, the accountant in most cases provides a comfort letter to the un-
derwriter as part of the underwriter’s due diligence process (AU, Section 634). The
comfort letter qualifies the auditor as an expert in the filing process and accordingly
enables the underwriter to share Section 11 litigation risk with the auditor. With re-
spect to the prospectus, Section 11 differentiates between expertised and nonexper-
tised information. The primary example of expertised information is the financial
statements, for which the auditor (as expert) assumes primary responsibility.
Most issuers register their secondary offerings using an S-1, S-2, or S-3 filing
(SB filings may be used by small businesses and F filings may be used by foreign
entities). The S-filings may be updated a number of times prior to the stock issu-
ance, without an apparent increase in risk to the auditor.4 S-2 and S-3 filings are
available as streamlined alternatives to the S-1 filing for qualified issuers. Essen-
tially, to use these forms, the issuer must have been filing periodic information
under the 1934 Securities Act for more than a year, must have adequate public
float, and must be in good standing with the SEC. The S-2 and S-3 filings enable
the issuer to include by reference financial and other company-specific information
filed previously, whereas an S-1 filing requires all financial information to be in-
cluded in the prospectus. Our discussions with practitioners indicate that inclusion
of the financial statements in the prospectus requires appreciably more effort on
the part of the auditor. However, the S-1 filing does not appear to directly increase
litigation risk to the auditor because the financial statements are considered part of
the prospectus in all filings (even when they are included by reference only).
In providing assurance services for an SEO, the auditor consents to allow the
client to incorporate the 10-K, 10-Q, or audit opinions either directly (S-1) or by
reference (S-2, S-3). The auditor also updates his or her most recent audit report
to include any events that have occurred since the last audit report.5 If there is a
material subsequent event, the auditor is required to perform additional audit work
to ensure that all disclosures are complete and reasonably presented. However, the
assurance work for an SEO typically is much less extensive than that required for
an IPO, in that the auditor can rely on past audit work.6 The client and/or under-
4. In some cases, clients file registration statements well in advance of the actual offering and
then try to time the offering to take advantage of favorable market conditions. This strategy requires
firms to update the registration statement a number of times before issuing the final prospectus. In
addition, in most cases the SEC will issue a comment letter to the company based on a preliminary
prospectus filing, and the company will respond with a revised registration statement. Only the final
registration statement and the prospectus appear to bear risk for the auditor.
5. Auditing standards require specific procedures to identify and classify subsequent events. AU
560 covers events after the balance sheet date but prior to the issuance of the auditor’s report. In the
SEO context, the audit firm agrees to incorporate or include reference to its most recent audit report in
the client’s registration statement and thus must update its review of subsequent events.
6. The ability to rely on prior audit work is the key difference between the accountant’s work in
an IPO and in an SEO. In most IPOs the accountant must conduct extensive audit procedures to issue
an audit opinion on the previous three years. In a secondary offering, the client already has been audited
as part of the IPO or as part of filing under the 1934 Act (i.e., 10-Ks and 10-Qs). The previous audit
work and opinion can therefore be included by reference in the SEO’s registration statement, and the
auditor need only evaluate events occurring after the most recent audit report date.
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writer can also request that the auditor perform additional procedures to provide
additional assurance on interim financial information. If this extra assurance is
sought, it typically is in the form of a review, although there is nothing to prevent
the request of a full audit of the interim financial results.7
As mentioned previously, the auditor must also provide a comfort letter to the
underwriter (similar to that which is required with an initial public offering). The
letter essentially outlines a set of agreed-upon procedures, the extent of which can
be the subject of some negotiation with the underwriter. The auditor generally
provides the following assurances in a comfort letter (Aftermann [1995]):
1. Positive assurance that the accountant is independent of the issuing com-
pany
2. Positive assurance that the audited financial statements comply with the
SEC’s accounting requirements
3. Negative assurance that the unaudited financial statements conform to
GAAP and comply with the SEC’s requirements
4. Negative assurance that from the date of the latest unaudited financial state-
ments contained in the registration statement to the effective date of the
registration statement there have not been any substantial increases in the
company’s long-term debt or decreases in its equity.8
The underwriter uses the assurances provided in the comfort letter to formally
document its reliance on the auditor as an expert in the event of Section 11 liti-
gation. The prospectus appears to serve partially as a risk-sharing device for issuers,
underwriters, and accountants. Underwriters in particular are able to share risk with
or shift risk to the auditors via the comfort letter, given auditors’ status as “experts”
under the 1933 Act. The underwriter would prefer that the auditor take responsi-
bility for as much of the information in the registration statement as possible,
because the underwriter thereby obtains insurance against any subsequently dis-
closed errors or omissions. The auditor’s incentive, however, is only to provide
expert opinion on the audited financial statements. As a result, auditors and un-
derwriters may negotiate extensively—in conjunction with attorneys—with respect
to the scope of the work required and the level of assurance the auditor will provide
regarding the accuracy of financial (and sometimes nonfinancial) data in the reg-
istration statement. We talked to numerous practitioners who mentioned that the
negotiations between the auditor and underwriters about the scope of the auditor’s
services are one of the key steps in the SEO process.
7. We reviewed approximately 100 registration statements at random and noted only one case
where the auditor performed a review rather than referencing or incorporating the most recent audit
report. We found no cases where an interim audit was performed.
8. Positive assurance implies that the auditor undertook specific procedures to determine whether
or not the standard of interest or assertion was met. Negative assurance implies that the auditor is not
aware of information that contradicts the assertion in question. For example, the auditor provides pos-
itive assurance concerning audited financial information, but only negative assurance concerning sub-
sequent changes in equity or debt after the date of the audit report.
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3. Hypothesis Development
Extant research typically classifies audit fee determinants into measures of
client size, complexity, and risk (e.g., Simunic [1980], Simunic and Stein [1987,
1996]). In this section we consider aspects of the secondary offering environment
that may be particularly important in explaining the cross-sectional variation in
SEO assurance fees.
3.1 Maturing Firm
Koop and Li (2001) document that IPO firms tend to be younger and to have
higher risk than SEO firms. Many IPO firms subsequently suffer financial distress
(Beatty [1993]), and hence many do not survive to seek SEO funding. One impli-
cation of these findings is that a firm that successfully develops from IPO to SEO
is likely to be both larger and more profitable at the SEO stage than it was at the
IPO stage. In essence, a history of successful operations reduces both the firm’s
operating risk and its risk of default.9
By extension, we assume that among IPO firms that do eventually have sec-
ondary offerings, an inverse relationship exists between firm risk and the delay
between the IPO date and the SEO date. Stated differently, more successful IPO
firms should be able to finance operations from debt or internally generated funds,
thereby making them less likely to return quickly to the equity markets for financing
(at higher costs). From an audit perspective, we expect that these firms will have
lower levels of business risk (the risk that the client’s business will fail) (Johnstone
[2000]) and inherent risk (the risk of misstatement in the absence of controls),
thereby allowing audit firms to expend less effort in achieving adequate assurance
for the secondary offering. The reduction in inherent risk is a result of the increased
financial stability of a mature company.10 As a result, we expect fees to be lower
for firms that have a significant delay between their IPO and their first SEO.11
We do not, however, anticipate that this relationship will hold uniformly across
all levels of assurance effort. For example, as indicated previously, appreciably
more effort is required for offerings filed using Form S-1 because the associated
prospectus must include all of the offering firm’s financial information. Further-
9. Alternative arguments can be made suggesting that SEO financing could result in increased
risk, due to dilution of insider holdings or funding of higher-risk projects. However, SEOs have been
shown empirically to be associated with reductions in default risk (Eberhart & Siddique [2002]). Con-
sistent with such a decline in risk, we find that IPO firms that successfully reach the SEO stage
experience increases in size, profitability, and liquidity, relative to their IPO levels.
10. Less mature firms are more likely than mature firms to face greater cash flow problems, poor
liquidity, insufficient capital, or unusual pressure to meet expectations. Hence there is greater incentive
for managers of these firms to try to make the financial statements look better than the true situation
(Gay & Simnett [2000]).
11. In common with most audit fee studies, we cannot specifically identify audit effort, nor can
we completely identify the different types of risks that may exist. However, we believe that business
risk and inherent risk are likely to be the main fee drivers for secondary offerings.
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more, firms required to use Form S-1 either do not have adequate public float or
have not been filing under the 1934 Securities Act for more than one year. These
factors lead us to propose that among firms that delay their SEOs, those that use
an S-1 filing will require more assurance effort and will therefore be subject to a
significant fee premium. Such a premium would not necessarily be anticipated for
firms that quickly bring a secondary issue to market because the close proximity
of the IPO S-1 filing should result in less incremental effort for the SEO S-1 filing.
Based on these relationships, we present the following hypotheses:
H1a: Among firms that do not use Form S-1, SEO fees will be lower if a significant
delay exists between the IPO and the SEO.
H1b: Among firms that have a significant delay between the IPO and the SEO,
SEO fees will be higher if Form S-1 is used.
3.2 Fee Premiums During the Audit Period
Two distinct factors lead us to believe that SEO fees will be higher when the
engagement coincides with the annual audit. One stems from opportunism. Hours
allocated to SEO procedures tend to be billed at a higher rate than hours allocated
to the annual audit.12 From a revenue maximization perspective, the audit firm
therefore has an incentive to classify a given task as relating to the SEO rather
than to the annual financial statement audit. Furthermore, from the client’s per-
spective, direct costs of raising equity capital reduce paid-in capital, not net income.
In other words, fees that are allocated to the secondary equity offering do not
impact corporate earnings at all, whereas the annual audit fee is a standard period
expense. Assuming that SEO firm managers prefer to maximize reported earnings,
an incentive exists for clients to shift fees from the annual audit to the secondary
offering. As a result, we anticipate that SEO assurance fees will be higher for
offerings that coincide with the year-end financial statement audit. We assume that
the ability to shift fees in this fashion is reduced when the secondary offering is
not closely aligned with the end-of-year audit. Practitioners with significant audit
experience have corroborated this assumption, noting that most relatively young
firms have all of their external audit work performed and billed at year-end.
Although incentives do exist for both parties to shift fees from the audit to the
SEO, we do not explicitly suggest that evidence of a fee premium would indicate
unethical practices by either audit firms or clients. First, as mentioned previously,
such a premium could stem from higher billable rates and greater involvement in
SEO engagements by high-level staff and partners during the annual audit period.
Second, our discussions with practitioners suggest that when SEOs occur concur-
rently with audit work, it often is extremely difficult to know which types of
services should be billed to the audit engagement and which should be billed to
12. We do not have specific data to support this statement, but it was a recurring theme in all of
our discussions with experienced practitioners.
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the secondary engagement. That is, even if misclassifications do exist, they may
well be completely unintentional. As a result of these factors, we stop short of
stating that intentional fee shifts do occur. We simply note that incentives to classify
audit work as SEO work do exist for both parties, and we implement as many
controls as possible in our empirical tests. Our hypothesis with respect to SEO fees
does not depend on whether fee premiums are attributable to auditor/client oppor-
tunism or to other reasons.
H2: SEO fees will be higher when the SEO engagement coincides with the annual
audit.
4. Data and Summary Statistics
We used the Securities Data Company (SDC) Worldwide New Issues database
to identify all secondary public equity offerings brought to market between 1991
and 2000.13 Like most previous researchers, we eliminated best-efforts IPO under-
writings, unit offerings, closed-end mutual offerings, and REIT offerings. Our in-
itial sample included 2,473 firms having both secondary and initial offerings listed
on SDC. The sample was reduced to 1,508 by requiring that each firm have non-
missing values for critical variables (e.g., accounting fees, auditor, etc.) for both
the initial offering and the secondary offering.14 We included only the first SEO
for each available sample firm, thereby reducing the available sample to 1,194
observations. Finally, we required companies to have COMPUSTAT data available
for the fiscal year immediately preceding their first secondary offering and CRSP
data for the calculation of standard deviation of returns; we also required all sample
companies to be audited by a Big 6 accounting firm.15 We removed 16 observations
identified as excessively influential, using the methods of Belsley et al. (1980). The
significance of our test variables is not affected by the inclusion or exclusion of
13. Our sample period includes two institutional changes to the litigation risk of auditors. First,
audit firms reorganized as limited liability organizations in August and September 1994. This reduced
the risk to audit partners who did not participate in an engagement, but not to partners associated with
an engagement; hence we expect no impact on SEO fees as a result of the change in business form.
Second, the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) was passed in December 1995.
This Act changed the laws governing litigation primarily under Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act. SEOs
generally are covered by Section 11 of the 1934 Act (although, given the inclusion of financial state-
ments filed under the 1934 Act, they remain open to 10b-5-type litigation). Nonetheless, Beatty, Drake
and Hogan (2003) find very little evidence of an effect on audit fees due to the 1995 Act. Similarly,
our SEO results are no different for the pre- and post-LLP and PSLRA periods.
14. Because 1991 is the first year that accounting fees are included in the SDC database, our
sample effectively includes only those firms having both initial public offerings and secondary offerings
after 1990.
15. Over 96% of the SEOs in our initial sample were audited by Big 6 firms. Consistent with
previous researchers, we do find a fee premium associated with Big 6 auditors. However, because the
relationship between audit fees and client-specific measures of firm risk and complexity may be different
for low- versus high-quality auditors (and because the small number of non-Big 6 auditors precludes
the effective modeling of such differences), our multivariate tests exclude issues handled by non-Big
6 auditors.
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TABLE 1
Selected Summary Measures for a Sample of 1,054 Secondary Equity
Offerings Made Between 1991 and 2000
Variable Mean Median Min Max
Secondary proceeds ($ millions, U.S. market) 105.71 60.90 2.30 2,733.70
Previous IPO proceeds ($ millions, U.S. market) 53.60 34.45 2.20 1,784.80
SEO accounting fee ($) 97,900 75,000 9,000 700,000
IPO accounting fee ($) 236,991 175,000 7,500 2,850,000
Underwriting fee, secondary (% of issue) 5.23% 5.20% 1.103% 10.000%
Underwriting fee, IPO (% of issue) 7.02% 7.00% 2.000% 10.169%
# Trading days between IPO and secondary 420.04 280.00 44 2214
Total assets ($ millions) 266.22 70.20 1.147 13,450.89
Leverage (liabilities/assets) 0.47 0.44 0.01 2.31
Inventory  accounts receivable/assets 0.30 0.24 0.00 0.95
Standard deviation of returns* 4.38% 3.89% 0.36% 12.50%
SEO fee/absolute value of net income 3.99% 1.04% 0.01% 412.09%
Variable %
% with international exposure** 20.9% — — —
% changing auditors from IPO 7.1% — — —
% with explanatory language in audit report 13.3% — — —
% with net loss at year-end preceding secondary offer 37.2% — — —
% filing Form S-1 for SEO 57.0% — — —
% with first SEO more than one year after IPO 53.9% — — —
% with SEO  75 trading days after fiscal year-end 31.1% — — —
*Standard deviation of returns is calculated from day  100 to day  100 relative to the secondary
offering date.
**Offerings with “international exposure” include those associated with nondomestic corporations
as well as those involving domestic companies with nonzero current or deferred foreign income taxes.
these observations; however, the fit of the model is appreciably better when they
are excluded. After applying these screens, our final sample includes 1054 second-
ary equity offerings. Similar to recent IPO studies (e.g., Fargher, Fields & Wilkins
[2000], Mayhew and Wilkins [2003]), we find that Ernst and Young and Arthur
Andersen have the greatest share of the SEO market (26% and 19%, respectively).
At 10%, Coopers and Lybrand had the smallest market share during our sample
period, though the combined PriceWaterhouseCoopers entity captured an SEO mar-
ket share of 26–28% in postmerger years.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample of firms. Two things are
particularly striking about the data. First, the mean size for U.S. secondary issues
is $105.71 million, which is roughly double the mean previous IPO proceeds. As
a source of financing, a firm’s first secondary equity issue greatly exceeds its initial
public offering. At the same time, the mean assurance fee associated with secondary
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offerings ($97,900) is less than half the fee associated with initial public offerings
($236,991). This same general trend exists for the gross underwriting fee as well;
it decreases from 7.02% to 5.23% from the initial offering to the secondary offer-
ing. These data suggest that relative to initial public offerings, secondary offerings
are not associated with as much risk and/or do not require as much effort from
accounting firms and underwriters.
Table 1 also reveals that half of the firms had their secondary offerings within
a little more than one year of their initial public offering. The mean value of
approximately 420 days is quite a bit higher than the median, however, suggesting
that some firms did not need additional equity financing for a considerable period
of time. With respect to filings and SEO timing, 57% used Form S-1 and roughly
a third reentered the equity market during the annual audit period (within 75 trading
days after fiscal year-end).
The companies in our sample are less highly leveraged than IPO firms, with
a mean ratio of total liabilities to total assets of 47%. Fargher, Fields and Wilkins
(2000) report a preissue value of approximately 79% for their sample of Big 6-
audited IPOs, suggesting that the infusion of equity capital associated with the
initial public equity offering decreases the company’s immediate financial risk.
Consistent with recent SEO studies (e.g., Koop and Li [2001]), Table 1 shows that
there is a good bit of variation in both the size of the companies issuing equity
and the dollar proceeds raised. Our sample firms have total assets ranging from
just over $1 million (Solopoint, Inc.) to $13.45 billion (Espirito Santo Financial
Holdings). Secondary issue size ranges from $2.3 million (First Cash, Inc.) to
roughly $2.73 billion (Genentech, Inc.). Like previous researchers, we use log
transformations of these values in our empirical tests.
In Table 2 we present median values for selected summary statistics based on
the proximity of the SEO to the prior fiscal year-end (Panel A) and to the original
IPO date (Panel B). Panel A reveals that firms having their secondary offerings
during the annual audit period have significantly higher SEO assurance fees than
other firms. This finding is consistent with our prediction in Hypothesis 2. How-
ever, because these firms are also significantly larger than other firms, we defer
drawing more concrete conclusions until this and other factors are controlled for
in our multivariate model.
With respect to the timing of the SEO relative to the IPO, Panel B of Table
2 shows that firms that waited for at least a year after their initial offering before
returning to the equity markets were larger, had a lower rate of net losses, and had
a smaller returns variance and market-to-book ratio than other firms, even though
they raised less capital in both offerings. In total, Panel B supports our earlier
assumption that, all else being equal, firms that are able to delay their secondary
offerings are more successful and less risky than firms that quickly reenter the
public equity market. These univariate findings are examined more fully in the
following section.
TABLE 2
Median Values for Selected Summary Measures Based on SEO Timing
Relative to the Prior Annual Audit (Panel A) and the Initial Public Offering
(Panel B)
Panel A: Timing of SEO relative to prior annual audit
Variable
SEO  75 Trading
Days from Prior
Annual Audit
SEO  75 Trading
Days from Prior
Annual Audit
Number of firms 328 726
Secondary proceeds ($ millions, U.S. market) 66.50* 59.25
Previous IPO proceeds ($ millions, U.S. market) 39.00* 32.60
Secondary accounting fee ($) 96,250* 75,000
IPO accounting fee ($) 175,000 175,000
# trading days between IPO and SEO 246 295
Total assets ($ millions) 86.81* 60.26
Leverage (liabilities/assets) 0.38* 0.46
Inventory  accounts receivable/assets 0.21* 0.26
Standard deviation of returns 3.93% 3.86%
Market-to-book ratio 5.97* 3.79
% changing auditors from IPO 5.49% 7.85%
% with explanatory language in audit report 10.37%* 14.60%
% with net loss at year-end preceding secondary offer 37.20% 37.19%
% filing Form S-1 for SEO 58.84% 56.20%
Panel B: Timing of SEO relative to IPO
Variable
SEO  1 Year
After IPO
SEO  1 Year
After IPO
Number of firms 486 568
Secondary proceeds ($ millions, U.S. market) 69.45* 55.00
Previous IPO proceeds ($ millions, U.S. market) 41.60* 28.30
Secondary accounting fee ($) 75,000 75,000
IPO accounting fee ($) 200,000* 150,000
# trading days between previous year-end and SEO 112 120
Total assets ($ millions) 61.17* 84.51
Leverage (liabilities/assets) 0.42 0.46
Inventory  accounts receivable/assets 0.23 0.26
Standard deviation of returns 4.05%* 3.72%
Market-to-book ratio 5.28* 3.88
% changing auditors from IPO 4.32%* 9.51%
% with explanatory language in audit report 12.55% 13.91%
% with net loss at year-end preceding secondary offer 40.33%* 34.51%
% filing Form S-1 for SEO 91.97%* 27.11%
*values are significantly different between partitions (p0.05)
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5. Empirical Method and Results
5.1 Empirical Method
Our multivariate model investigates the pricing of assurance services in sec-
ondary equity offerings. The model builds on the work of previous IPO researchers
and is specified as follows:
ACCTFEE  γ1  γ2ASSETS  γ3PROCEEDS  γ4FOREIGNj j j j
 γ5INVREC  γ6DEBT  γ7STDDEV  γ8QUALj j j j
 γ9AUDCHG  γ10RELYEAR  γ11DELAY (1)j j j
 γ12S-1  γ13 DELAY *S-1  γ14AUDITj j j j
 γ15LOWEARN  εj j
In eq. (1), ACCTFEE is the natural logarithm of the accounting fee associated
with the secondary equity offering. The first two independent variables in equation
(1) are proxies for size and/or complexity of operations. ASSETS represents the
logged total asset value for the firm at its last fiscal year-end before the secondary
offering and PROCEEDS represents the logged dollar proceeds from the secondary
offering in U.S. markets. FOREIGN, which takes a value of 1 if the secondary
offering is an ADR or if it is associated with a domestic firm with foreign subsid-
iaries (proxied by the presence of foreign income taxes), and INVREC (inventory
and receivables as a percentage of total assets) are included as proxies for general
audit-related duties associated with the secondary offering. Both of these measures
typically are included and are significant in IPO fee studies, presumably because
the complexities of international operations and the greater substantive testing re-
quired for firms with higher levels of noncash current assets should impact fees
positively. Because of the nature of SEO assurance work, however, it is less clear
that these measures should be priced in our setting. We include them to be con-
sistent with IPO fee studies and perhaps to reveal differences that exist between
fees associated with these two types of equity offerings.
The next two variables—DEBT and STDDEV—represent total liabilities as a
percentage of total assets and standard deviation of returns from day 100 to day
100 relative to the secondary offering, respectively.16 These measures are in-
cluded as general controls for client risk. We also model the effects of modified
audit reports (QUAL, an indicator variable equal to 1 if explanatory language was
included in the previous year-end audit report) and auditor changes (AUDCHG, an
indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s SEO auditor is not the same as its IPO
16. The shortest interval between the IPO date and the SEO date is 44 trading days. For this
observation, the standard deviation of returns is calculated from day 44 through day 100 relative
to the SEO date. The same approach is used for all other firms having SEOs less than 100 trading days
after their IPO. As a sensitivity test we also defined STDDEV as the standard deviation of returns for
200 trading days after the SEO for all firms. Our results are not sensitive to this alternative specification.
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auditor) on SEO assurance fees.17 Based on previous fee literature, we expect both
of these variables to be positive; however, the influence of QUAL on ACCTFEE
is likely to be less significant in the SEO context because much of its effect should
have been priced in the previous year-end audit. Finally, we include RELYEAR
to control for inflationary trends during the sample period. RELYEAR takes values
from 1 to 10 for SEOs occurring from 1991 through 2000, respectively.18
The next three variables—DELAY, S-1, and DELAY*S-1—are used to test
Hypothesis 1. DELAY (S-1) is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the
SEO occurred more than one year after the IPO (filed using Form S-1), and 0
otherwise. Because S-1 and DELAY*S-1 are included in the model, the coefficient
for DELAY measures the marginal fee effect associated with a delayed SEO for
all firms that do not use Form S-1. As previously discussed, firms that do not have
to return to the equity markets as quickly after their initial public offering are likely
to be less risky. This notion is confirmed by the data presented in Panel B of Table
2. We therefore expect, consistent with Hypothesis 1a, the coefficient for DELAY
to be negative.
Our primary interest in S-1 relates to its interaction with DELAY, in that we
are interested in testing the marginal impact that an S-1 filing has on fees of firms
that delay their SEOs. Because S-1s are more complicated filings and entail more
assurance effort, we anticipate fees to be higher if Form S-1 is used. That is,
Hypothesis 1b will be supported if the sum of the S-1 coefficient and the DE-
LAY*S-1 coefficient (i.e., γ12  γ13) is positive.19 It is important to note that in
eq. (1), the coefficient associated with S-1 in isolation (i.e., γ12) captures the mar-
ginal fee affect attributable to nondelaying firms that use S-1 filings—not to S-1
filings in general. We do not have any formal expectations for the S-1 coefficient,
although a reasonable argument could be advanced that it should be negative, given
that nondelaying firms, by definition, previously filed a comparable form for their
IPO in the same year.
Our final two variables relate to the fee premiums that may exist among sec-
ondary offerings that are concurrent with the annual audit. AUDIT defines firms
having issues that came to market less than 75 trading days (approximately 31⁄2
months) after the fiscal year-end. Based on Hypothesis 2, we expect the coefficient
for AUDIT to be positive. Because AUDIT could be positive for a number of
reasons, we include LOWEARN in an attempt to identify clients that would have
17. Our coding of QUAL is consistent with that of Copley and Douthett (2002), though we admit
that the mere existence of “explanatory language” in an audit report may not be indicative of additional
audit effort or risk. Butler, Leone and Willenborg (2004) show that “explanatory language” audit opin-
ions cover a wide range of audit reports ranging from a change in accounting principle to going concern
opinions.
18. RELYEAR simply captures (in a relatively parsimonious fashion) the residual inflationary
characteristics present in SEO fees that are not accounted for entirely by the other independent variables.
Our inferences are unchanged when we use a series of yearly indicator variables.
19. An alternative, but equivalent, way of framing this expectation is that γ11  γ12  γ13 (i.e.,
the fee effect for delaying firms using S-1 filings) minus γ11 (i.e., the fee effect for delaying firms not
using S-1 filings) should be greater than 0.
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the greatest incentive to act opportunistically.20 LOWEARN is an indicator variable
taking the value of 1 if the firm is in the bottom half of the SEO firm earnings per
share distribution, and 0 otherwise. Our assumption is that, all else being equal,
firms with lower levels of earnings have a greater incentive to try to shift fees out
of the audit engagement and into the SEO engagement. As a result, the coefficient
for LOWEARN should be positive. We realize that this is a noisy measure, given
that firms with lower earnings are also more likely to have higher levels of assur-
ance risk. However, to the extent that the other independent variables control for
a significant proportion of such risks, the coefficient for LOWEARN may be at
least somewhat indicative of an SEO firm’s propensity to try to shift fees.
5.2 Initial Results
Simple correlations between the independent variables in eq. (1) are reported
in Table 3. As would be expected, a number of these measures are correlated with
each other. For example, large firms tend to have larger secondary offerings and
are more likely to have an international presence (i.e., ASSETS is positively cor-
related with PROCEEDS and FOREIGN). Similarly, firms with low earnings levels
tend to be smaller and to have higher earnings variation (i.e., LOWEARN is neg-
atively correlated with ASSETS and is positively correlated with STDDEV). How-
ever, even though some of the simple correlations are relatively high, regression
diagnostics reveal that multicollinearity is not a significant problem in eq. (1).21
The estimates for the audit fee model are reported in Table 4. Consistent with
research in both audit and IPO settings across many different countries, the assur-
ance fees for secondary offerings can be explained by variables used to proxy for
client size and risk.22 SIZE and PROCEEDS are both positive and significant,
indicating that fees are increasing with client and offer size. Furthermore, firms
that are more highly leveraged pay a premium for their SEO assurance work. In
contrast to the audit fee and IPO fee literature, however, we do not find a significant
relationship between fees and FOREIGN. The insignificance of this variable sug-
gests that auditors may not be required to devote as much time to substantive testing
of international SEOs, relative to standard audit and/or IPO work for international
organizations. In other words, the auditor’s ability to rely on previous audited
20. For the firms in our sample, the SEO fee represents, on average, approximately 4% of the
absolute value of reported net income. Given the attention paid to reported earnings, we believe that
this may be of sufficient magnitude to encourage opportunistic behavior.
21. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) in excess of 10 are often indicative of problematic multi-
collinearity. The largest VIF in the model represented by eq. (1) is 7.67. Additional diagnostics also
reveal that heteroscedasticity is not a significant problem (p  0.15). When we use t-statistics calculated
using the method of White (1980), our results are qualitatively unchanged.
22. The adjusted r-square for our SEO model is approximately 19%. Although this value is
considerably smaller than what typically is found in audit fee models (e.g., 87% in Fields, Fraser &
Wilkins [2004], 66% in Ashbaugh, LaFond & Mayhew [2003], and 70%–88% in Ferguson & Stokes
[2002]), it is directly comparable with the explanatory power documented in IPO fee models (e.g., 26%
in Mayhew & Wilkins [2003], 25%–30% in Willenborg [1999], and 19% in Copley & Douthett [2002]).
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TABLE 4
Results of an Assurance Fee Model for a Sample of 1,054 Secondary Equity
Offerings Made Between 1991 and 2000
ACCTFEE  γ1  γ 2ASSETS  γ 3PROCEEDS  γ4FOREIGN  γ 5INVREC  γ 6DEBTj j j j j j
 γ 7STDDEV  γ 8QUAL  γ 9AUDCHG  γ10RELYEAR  γ11DELAYj j j j j
 γ12S-1  γ13DELAY *S-1  γ14AUDIT  γ15LOWEARN  εj j j j j j
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient Estimate p-value
Intercept  10.004* 0.001
ASSETS  0.046* 0.009
PROCEEDS  0.122* 0.001
FOREIGN  0.062 0.095
INVREC  0.156* 0.033
DEBT  0.147* 0.017
STDDEV  2.135 0.069
QUAL  0.071 0.101
AUDCHG  0.113 0.058
RELYEAR  0.059* 0.001
DELAY  0.271* 0.003
S-1 ? 0.114 0.261
DELAY*S-1  0.393* 0.001
AUDIT  0.156* 0.001
LOWEARN  0.086* 0.030
F-statistic for test of (S-1  DELAY*S-1)0 22.66 (p0.001)
Model F-statistic 18.74 (p0.001)
Adjusted R-square 0.191
* denotes significance at p0.05; where directional predictions are made, p-values are one-tailed
ACCTFEE  log of accounting fee associated with secondary equity offering
ASSETS  log of total assets at fiscal year-end proceding the secondary offering
PROCEEDS  log of secondary offering proceeds in U.S. market
FOREIGN  1 if ADR or foreign subsidiary present,  0 otherwise
INVREC  inventory and receivables/total assets (before secondary offering)
DEBT  total liabilities/total assets (before secondary offering)
STDDEV  standard deviation of returns from day 100 to day 100, relative to secondary date
QUAL  1 if audit opinion contained explanatory language,  0 otherwise
AUDCHG  1 if auditor at secondary offering is not the same as auditor at IPO,  0 otherwise
RELYEAR  1 if secondary offering occurred in 1991,  2 if in 1992 . . . 10 if in 2000
DELAY  1 if secondary offering occurred more than one year after IPO,  0 otherwise
S-1  1 if secondary offering was filed using form S-1,  0 otherwise
AUDIT  1 if secondary offering occurred within 75 trading days of previous year-end,  0
otherwise
LOWEARN  1 if firm had below-median earnings per share during the SEO year,  0 otherwise
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financial statements appears to reduce the relative effort required in the SEO en-
gagement.
Of particular interest to this study are the coefficients associated with DELAY,
the sum of (S-1 and DELAY*S-1), AUDIT, and LOWEARN. The significant neg-
ative coefficient for DELAY and the significant positive coefficient for the sum of
(S-1 and DELAY*S-1) reveal that firms that are able to postpone their secondary
offerings for at least one year have significantly lower SEO assurance fees (γ11 
0), unless they file Form S-1 (γ12  γ13  0). These findings support Hypotheses
1a and 1b, and suggest that the higher levels of assurance effort associated with
S-1 filings offset the fee discount afforded to lower-risk firms that have been able
to finance their operations more cheaply—whether internally or through the debt
markets.
Table 4 also reveals that, consistent with Hypothesis 2, the coefficient for
AUDIT is positive and significant. Although we cannot assert unequivocally that
the coefficient for AUDIT reflects the intentional shifting of fees by SEO firms,
the significant positive coefficient for LOWEARN does generally support this no-
tion (assuming that firms with lower earnings have a greater incentive to try to
keep fees from flowing through the income statement).23 As previously mentioned,
we realize that LOWEARN is a noisy measure and is likely to be correlated with
other forms of firm risk. However, when we omit LOWEARN and include an
indicator variable defining firms in net loss positions, as has been done frequently
in the fee literature, the coefficient for loss firms is not statistically significant. This
result gives us some confidence that LOWEARN is not simply proxying for the
assurance risks associated with highly unprofitable firms.
In addition to providing support for our hypotheses, the model reported in
Table 4 can be used to illustrate the economic significance (with respect to SEO
fees) of our test variables. For example, when DELAY, S-1, DELAY*S-1, and
AUDIT are set equal to 0, the predicted fee is $99,972 for a domestic SEO in the
year 2000 with the continuous variables entered at their mean values but with no
audit qualification, auditor change, or low earnings. When DELAY is set equal to
1 and the other three test variables are held at 0, the predicted fee drops to $76,240.
Thus, firms that are able to delay their offerings and that do not file Form S-1
experience large fee discounts. When we keep DELAY at 1 and set S-1 and DE-
LAY*S-1 equal to 1, however, the predicted fee jumps to $100,775. In other words,
among DELAY firms, an S-1 filing causes fees to increase by $24,535 (a 32%
increase from $76,240) and effectively offsets the discount attributable to delaying
the offering. If we also set AUDIT equal to 1, modeling SEOs occurring during
the annual audit period, the predicted fee increases from $100,775 to $117,788.
23. When we augment this measure further by restricting it to represent LOWEARN firms that
report the largest ratio of SEO fees to net income (in absolute value terms), the coefficient is even
more significant (p  0.0001). In total, these findings suggest that clients that have the greatest incentive
to shift fees away from earnings (those with poor earnings AND with fees that, if not expensed, would
increase earnings dramatically) tend to have the largest SEO fees.
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These values indicate that both the timing of secondary offerings and the filing
form used do impact SEO fees in an economically significant fashion.
5.3 Sensitivity Tests
5.3.1 Large Versus Small Firms
Previous research (e.g., Craswell, Francis & Taylor [1995] and Mayhew &
Wilkins 2003]) has shown that the determinants of IPO fees are not necessarily
the same for small firms and large firms. To test the homogeneity of the relationship
between SEO fees and firm size, we estimated our model separately for below-
median total asset firms and above-median total asset firms. For below-median
firms, the coefficients for DELAY, S-1, and DELAY*S-1 are insignificant, but the
coefficients for AUDIT and LOWEARN remain positive and significant. For
above-median firms, the significance levels for all of these variables are directly
comparable to those shown for the full sample in Table 4. In total, the only dif-
ference between the two sample partitions involves the DELAY and S-1 variables.
Based on this evidence, we conjecture that large firms that are able to delay their
SEOs are the primary beneficiaries of the SEO fee discounts that are attributable
to decreasing levels of risk (manifest in the DELAY coefficient and in the S-
1*DELAY coefficient).
5.3.2 Economies of Scale
Fargher, Fields and Wilkins (2000) and Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) show
that IPO fees are significantly lower in industries where IPOs are most prevalent.
One possible interpretation of this finding is that economies of scale exist with
respect to the preparation of regulatory filings in high-volume industries. To test
for the presence of this effect in our sample of SEO firms, we added an indicator
variable defining firms in the three industries having the most secondary offerings
during our sample period.24 The coefficient estimate for this variable is negative
and significant (p  0.05), consistent with previous research, and our inferences
with respect to the other test variables are unchanged.
5.3.3 Busy Season
A majority of firms have fiscal years that coincide with the calendar year.
Because AUDIT defines clients with SEOs coming to market during their (and
most other firms’) annual audit period, it is conceivable that the observed fee pre-
mium could be due to audit firms pricing their nonaudit services higher during
busy season. To test this possibility, we added an additional independent variable,
BUSY, to eq. (1). BUSY is equal to 1 for all SEOs occurring between January 1
24. SIC codes 28, 36, and 73 represent Chemicals and Allied Products, Electrical Equipment, and
Business Services, respectively. These industries account for over 40% of our sample observations.
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and March 31 of a given year and is equal to 0 for all other offerings.25 When
AUDIT is omitted from the model, BUSY is positive and significant (p  0.01).
However, when AUDIT is included in the model along with BUSY, AUDIT retains
its significance while BUSY becomes insignificant. The insignificance of BUSY in
the presence of AUDIT suggests that the fee premium stemming from an SEO
occurring during a client’s annual audit period is specific to that particular client—
not to seasonality in annual audit work for all clients. These findings lend additional
support to the notion that fees may be shifted from the audit engagement to the
SEO engagement.
5.3.4 Alternative AUDIT Specifications
In an attempt to gain more insights into the possibility that fee premiums are
attributable to opportunism, we tested the sensitivity of our model to different
AUDIT specifications. First, we defined AUDIT to include, alternatively, firms
having SEOs within 63 and 42 trading days (three and two months, respectively)
of the previous fiscal year-end. In both of these models AUDIT remains positive
and significant. This finding should not come as a surprise, given that both alter-
native specifications would include the window in which most of the year-end audit
work is completed. That is, if fee premiums are due to opportunism, the significance
of AUDIT should decrease only when the partition is altered to include firms for
which fee shifting would be more difficult (i.e., firms for which the SEO is not
concurrent with year-end audit procedures). When we increase the window to 84
trading days (four months), AUDIT remains positive and significant. As we push
the window to 105 trading days (five months), however, the significance of AUDIT
goes away. In total, these findings are consistent with the notion that fee premiums
are most likely to exist when the greatest opportunities for fee management exist.
6. Concluding Remarks
This study investigates the pricing of assurance services in secondary equity
offerings (SEOs). We examine fees for secondary issues using a well-established
model that considers client size, complexity and risk. We also consider additional
measures beyond the conventional fee model that are relevant in the context of a
firm’s first secondary equity offering. For example, previous research in finance
suggests that a firm that successfully develops from its IPO to an SEO will have
a decline in risk. If this decrease in risk is reflected in the pricing of assurance
services, firms that have a longer delay between their IPO and their first SEO should
have lower SEO fees. Our findings confirm this relationship. However, we also
show that the relationship reverses if the SEO is filed using Form S-1, indicating
25. Under specifications where BUSY  1 if the SEO occurs between January 31 and April 30
or, alternatively, between December 1 and April 30, our results are unchanged. Although the pairwise
correlation between BUSY and AUDIT is significant, there is no significant multicollinearity present
in the regression model.
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a relative fee premium that appears to be attributable to higher levels of assurance
effort. We also find that SEO fees are higher for issues that occur concurrently
with the annual financial statement audit. We conjecture that bringing the SEO to
market during the annual audit may facilitate the shifting of fees from the financial
statement audit to the SEO engagement. This notion is supported by evidence that
fees are significantly higher for firms having the greatest incentives to exclude fees
from the income statement.
Like most research of this nature, the richness of our model and the inferences
we make are limited by the availability of data. In particular, an adequate time
series of pre- and post-SEO audit fees would be necessary to test explicitly for the
shifting of fees between engagements. Future researchers may wish to investigate
this issue more thoroughly as data become available and as audit fee disclosures
become more standardized. Furthermore, an investigation of the audit strategy
adopted in planning SEO assurance services and the allocation of audit resources
would provide greater insight into the demand for and supply of assurance services
in this area. The SEO context does, however, speak to issues that are relevant to
other settings. Whether the fee premium documented in this study stems from
opportunism or not, our analysis suggests that incentives certainly exist for both
auditors and clients to shift fees between different engagements. Future research
could potentially examine this issue in a broader context as data on fees for audit
and nonaudit services become more widely available.
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